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I.
A.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions∗
Issues
This memorandum addresses the legal elements of crimes against humanity

(rape) according to the The Prosecutor v. Semanza,1 which rejected the definition of rape
as decided in The Prosecutor v. Akayesu2 and adopted the definition of rape as decided by
the Appeals Chamber in The Prosecutor v. Kunurac.3 The first part of this memorandum
identifies the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity and the elements of the
underlying offense of rape. The second part of this memorandum considers what exactly
witnesses are required to say in order to meet the legal elements of the offense. The third
part of this memorandum explains and justifies the differences between the approach to
rape trials in the United States and the approach to rape trials in the ICTR. The fourth
part of this memorandum discusses the cultural implications of asking rape victims to
testify using culturally offensive words such as “penis” and “vagina.” The fifth part of
this memorandum proposes ways to elicit evidence about this culturally sensitive topic.

∗

ISSUE 17: Consider and discuss the legal elements of Crimes Against Humanity (Rape) adopted in The
Prosecutor v. Semanza which rejected the definition of rape as decided in the Akayesu case and adopted the
definition set out in the Appeals Chamber decision in Kunurac. Discuss the words and/or phrases witnesses
are required to say when describing the act of rape in order to meet the legal elements of the offense (i.e., is
it sufficient for a witness to say “He raped me” or must she say “His penis penetrated my vagina”). Discuss
the cultural implications of asking women to use culturally offensive words such as “penis” and “vagina”.
Propose modes by which this evidence can be given to bridge this cultural gap.
1

The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza (hereinafter Semanza), ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, 15 May 2003.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27.]
2

The Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu (hereinafter Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 Sept. 1998.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25.]

3

The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunurac et. al. (hereinafter Kunurac), IT-96-23, Appeal Judgment, 31 July
2003. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32.]
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B.

Summary of Conclusions

(1) In order to meet the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity
under Article 3 of the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, 1) there must be an attack, 2) the attack must be
widespread or systematic, 3) the attack must be directed against any
civilian population, 4) the attack must be committed on
discriminatory grounds, and 5) the accused must have acted with the
appropriate mens rea.
An attack is a violent course of conduct which is not limited to the use of armed
force. It encompasses any inhumane treatment of any civilian population and may
precede, outlast, or continue during an armed conflict. In order for the acts of the
accused to count as a crime against humanity, they must form part of the attack, which
means by their nature or consequences, they must be liable to further the attack.
The requirements that an attack be widespread or systematic should be read
disjunctively. “Widespread” refers to the large-scale nature of the attack and the number
of victims, while systematic refers to the organized nature of the attack. A civilian
population must be the primary object of the attack rather than an incidental target. The
attack must be directed against a civilian population on national, political, ethnical, racial,
or religious grounds. To meet the mens rea requirement for crimes against humanity, the
accused must have intended to commit the underlying offense and must have known that
there was an attack on the civilian population and that the underlying offense comprised
part of the attack.

(2) The legal elements of rape according to The Prosecutor v. Semanza are
1) the non-consensual penetration, however slight (a) of the vagina or
anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth
of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator, and 2) consent for this
purpose must be given voluntarily and freely and is assessed within
the context of the surrounding circumstances.

2

The legal elements of rape adopted in Semanza in 2003 are narrower than those
set out in The Prosecutor v. Akayesu in 1998. While the Court in Akayesu purposefully
avoided focusing on mechanical descriptions of objects and body parts in its definition of
rape, the Court in Semanza considered a definition which focused on mechanical
descriptions and lack of consent (as enunciated in The Prosecutor v. Kunurac)
persuasive.

(3) Based on the transcripts of The Prosecutor v. Furundzija and The
Prosecutor v. Kunurac, the two cases upon which the Semanza
definition of rape is based, a rape victim must say that he/she was
raped, but the naming of specific body parts may be left to careful
questioning by the Prosecution.
Considering the elements of rape adopted in Semanza, it would seem that during
trial, a witness would be required to describe the act of penetration in detail, naming the
body part penetrated and what it was penetrated by. However, in practice, this has not
been the case. Generally during examination and cross-examination, a rape victim can
say he/she was raped, and the naming of body parts can be left to yes or no questioning
posed by the Prosecution. The fact that witnesses usually do not have to go into explicit
detail on the witness stand does not mean they never have to go into explicit detail at all.
Prosecutors and investigators must know the particulars of the rape so that they do not
encounter any surprises in the courtroom.

(4) Aggressive, sexualized American-style cross-examination would be
inappropriate and useless in the ICTR.
The U.S. approach to rape victim cross-examination is rooted in the idea that
rape is an easy charge to make but a difficult one to defend. U.S. defense attorneys may
point to flaws in the complainant’s character or testimony in an effort to cast her as a liar
and make her account sound more like the defendant’s version of consensual intercourse.
3

They may also focus on the complainant’s sexuality through repeated references to body
parts and provocative clothing or behavior. This is also done in an effort to convince the
jury that the complainant somehow consented. Such an approach has no place in the
ICTR, whose rules of procedure and evidence are not based on a distrust of rape
complainants. Also, the possibility of a Rwandan woman’s consent in the mass rape that
took place during the genocide is remote enough to render a focus on consent in crossexamination pointless.

(5) Requiring rape victims to discuss in detail the body parts penetrated
and what they were penetrate by may exacerbate the shame and
rejection they already feel, therefore measures should be taken to
ensure their comfort and safety.
While saying “I was raped” is difficult enough for rape victims in general,
admitting to having been raped and then having to describe that rape in detail may be
particularly painful for Rwandan women who face rape trauma syndrome, shame,
isolation from their family and community, guilt for having survived the genocide,
disfigured genitals, infertility, poverty, or an inability to remarry or reintegrate into
society.

II.

Factual Background
Throughout history, sexual violence has been directed against females during

situations of armed conflict.4 It has taken the form of sexual mutilation, forced
pregnancy, rape or sexual slavery. It has also been used as a weapon to terrorize,
degrade, and humiliate a particular community and to achieve a political end.5 The rape

4

Human Rights Watch, Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath
(1996) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch], at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm. [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 36.]

4

of an individual woman translates into an assault upon the community because of the
emphasis on a woman’s sexual virtue that is present in every culture. The shame goes
beyond the victim; it humiliates her family and everyone associated with her because of
her ethnicity, religion, social class, or political affiliation.6
In the years preceding the genocide, Tutsi women were the targets of hateful
propaganda. Through both written press and radio, Hutu extremists portrayed Tutsi
women as spies and seductresses bent on dominating and undermining Hutu men.7 When
the violence began in 1994, so did the widespread rape of Tutsi women (and Hutu women
affiliated with Tutsis through marriage, friendship or politics). They were individually
raped, gang-raped, raped with objects such as knives, sticks, and guns, held as sex slaves,
and/or sexually mutilated.8
Though the 1994 genocide campaign has ended, its devastating effects remain,
especially in rape victims who have been widowed, impoverished, diseased, disfigured,
or rendered infertile. Many have been rejected by their families and communities. Many
live in fear of their attackers. Many have had illegal abortions or committed infanticide
as a result of rape induced pregnancy. With a post-genocide population that is an
estimated seventy percent female, the damage inflicted upon Rwandan society by mass
rape cannot be underestimated or ignored.9

5

Id., at 2.

6

Id. at 10.

7

Id. at 11.

8

Id.at 20.

9

Id. at 5.

5

Sexual violence against females that takes place during armed conflict or
systematic persecution is a clear violation of international law. Perpetrators of sexual
violence, or those responsible for the perpetration, may be prosecuted for rape as a war
crime, a crime against humanity, or as an act of genocide.10 Yet rape and other forms of
sexual violence have a long history of being used as weapons of conflict and going
unpunished.11
Recent United Nations world conferences have emphasized the gravity and
prevalence of gender based violence in conflict and the obligation of individual states and
the international community to take steps to prevent and punish such crimes.12 Reports
of the widespread use of rape as a war tactic in the former Yugoslavia provoked
international attention, condemnation, and investigation. As a result, the judges and the
chief prosecutor for the ICTY have stated a commitment to prosecuting rape13 and the
ICTY has repeatedly held that rape constitutes torture.14

10

Id. at 16.

11

“During World War I, the German Army routinely raped women in Belgium and France, while Nazi and
Japanese forces implemented policies of rape and forced prostitution during World War II. More recently
in the former Yugoslavia, sexual assaults were committed by and against all parties to the conflict, but most
egregiously by Bosnian Serb military and civilian personnel against Bosnian women.” Patricia Visseur
Sellers and Kaoru Okuizumi, Symposium: Prosecuting International Crimes: An Inside View: Intentional
Prosecution of Sexual Assaults, 7 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 46 (1997). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 16.] Though the international community was aware of the sexual assaults
taking place throughout World War II, few steps were taken to prevent them from occurring or punish
those guilty of committing them. Nowhere in the Charter for the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg was “rape” or “sexual assaults” explicitly mentioned, despite numerous reports and transcripts
containing evidence of rape, forced prostitution, forced sterilization, forced abortion, pornography, and
sexual mutilation. Jocelyn Campanaro, Note, Women, War, and International Law: The Historical
Treatment of Gender-Based War Crimes, 89 GEO. L.J. 2557. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 17.]
12

“Both the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference in Human
Rights in June 1993, and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth United
Nations Conference on Women in September 1995 underscore that violations against women in conflict
contravene international law.” Human Rights Watch, supra note 4, at 16.

6

The ICTR is explicitly empowered to prosecute rape as a crime against humanity
and a violation of the Geneva Conventions.15 In Akayesu, the ICTR made the first
conviction of either genocide or crimes against humanity for sexual violence.16 Akayesu
enunciated a broad definition of rape as compared to previous trials in the ICTY.17
However, the Akayesu elements of rape were rejected by the ICTR in Semanza, which
adopted the ICTY’s more mechanical style of defining rape.18 This newly narrowed
definition should not prevent the ICTR from fulfilling a legal (and human) mandate to
hold accountable those who are responsible for the perpetration of sexual violence.

III.

The Legal Elements of Crimes Against Humanity (Rape)
adopted in The Prosecutor v. Semanza
In Semanza, the Court found that Laurent Semanza, in the presence of commune

and military authorities, encouraged a crowd to rape Tutsi women before killing them.
Immediately thereafter, one of the men from the crowd raped Victim A, who was hiding
in a nearby home. Victim B was killed by two other men from the crowd, but the Court
felt there was insufficient evidence to prove that she too was raped.19 In light of the
generalized instructions to rape and kill Tutsis, the ethnic group targeted by the
widespread attack, the Court found that the rape was part of the widespread and
13

Id.

14

Patricia Viseur Sellers, Sexual Violence and Peremptory Norms: The Legal Value of Rape (hereinafter
Sexual Violence and Peremptory Norms) (Lecture given March 2, 2002 at CWRU School of Law).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 37.]

15

Human Rights Watch, supra note 4, at 16.

16

Sellers, Sexual Violence and Peremptory Norms, supra note 16.

17

See Akayesu, supra note 3.

18

See Semanza, supra note 1.

19

Id. at ¶476.

7

systematic attack against the civilian Tutsi population and that the assailant was so
aware.20 The Court found that Semanza, the principal perpetrator, committed rape as a
crime against humanity because the following elements were met:

A.

Chapeau Elements
Article 3 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Statute lays

out a two-tiered definition of crimes against humanity.21 It reads:
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute
persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national,
political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)

Murder;
Extermination;
Enslavement;
Deportation;
Imprisonment
Torture;
Rape
Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
Other inhumane acts.22

The first tier of the definition contains the chapeau elements, the general requirements of
the offense that make it a crime against humanity, as opposed to an ordinary crime.23 The
second tier consists of the underlying offenses, such as torture or rape, which constitute
crimes against humanity if committed in the context of the chapeau elements.

20

Id. at ¶477.

21

Guénael Mettraux, Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 237, 240 (2002) (hereinafter
Mettraux). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]

22

Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter ICTR Statute) [Annex to U.N.
SCOR Res. 955] art. 28, reprinted in 33 ILM 1598 (1994). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 34.]

23

Mettraux, supra note 21, at 240.

8

The specific language used in the definition of crimes against humanity in the
ICTR Statute differs from other definitions of crimes against humanity in international
war crimes tribunals.24 The requirement that an attack be “widespread or systematic” had
never been codified in a statute.25 Also, the ICTR Statute, unlike the Statute for the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), explicitly requires
discriminatory intent, as an attack must be “on national, political, ethnic, racial or
religious grounds,” but does not require that an attack be “committed in armed
conflict.”26
Therefore, in order to meet the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity
under the ICTR Statute, 1) there must be an attack (to which the acts of the accused must
be linked), 2) the attack must be widespread or systematic, 3) the attack must be directed
against any civilian population, 4) the attack must be committed on discriminatory
grounds, and 5) the accused must have acted with the appropriate mens rea.27

24

KELLY D. ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTION IN INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNAL 345 (1997), citing the definitions of crimes against humanity in the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, the Allied Control Council Law No. 10, the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo), and the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (hereinafter ICTY Statute). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]
25

The words “widesepread and systematic” were used in ICTY judgments and are now codified in the
Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court. Jordan J. Paust, Content and Contours of Genocide,
Crimes Against Humanity, and War Crimes, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE POST –COLD WAR WORLD:
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF LI HAOPEI 292 (Sienho Yee and Wang Tieya eds., 2001). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
26

ICTR Statute, art. 3, supra note 22; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (hereinafter ICTY Statute), U.N. Doc. S/25704, art. 5. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 35.]
27

Semanza, supra note 1, at ¶327.

9

(1) Attack
An attack is a course of conduct in which acts of violence are committed.28 The
concepts of “attack” and “armed conflict” are separate notions.29 Under customary
international law, an attack can precede, outlast, or continue during an armed conflict.30
An attack has a different meaning in the context of crimes against humanity than in the
context of war. In the context of crimes against humanity, an attack is not limited to the
use of armed force. It includes any inhumane mistreatment of any civilian population.31
Also, though an attack is an independent violation of the laws of war, it is not, by itself, a
crime against humanity.32
In establishing whether an attack occurred against a particular population, it is
irrelevant that the victimized population also committed atrocities against its opponent
population. Both sides could potentially have committed crimes against humanity.33

(a) Linkage between the Attack and the Acts of the Accused
In order for the acts of the accused to count as a crime against humanity, they
must form part of the attack.34 To form part of the attack, an act must, by its nature or
consequences, be liable to further the attack.35 This can be assessed by considering the

28

Mettraux, supra note 21, at 244.

29

Kunurac, supra note 2, at ¶86.

30

The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (hereinafter Tadic), IT-94-01, Appeal Judgment ¶251, 15 July 1999.

31

Semanza, supra note 1, at ¶327; Kunurac, supra note 2, at ¶86.

32

Mettraux, supra note 21, at 245.

33

Kunurac, supra note 2, at ¶87.

34

Id. at ¶417.

35

Mettraux, supra note 21, at 251.
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nature and purpose of the attack and the impact of the criminal act in question upon the
attainment of that purpose.36 A single act can form part of an attack, as long as it is not
isolated or random.37 It is not necessary that there be many victims involved,38 that the
act occur in the heat of the attack,39 or that the victim of the act be part of the group
specifically targeted in the attack.40

(2) Widespread or Systematic
The requirements of “widespread” and “systematic,” as with customary
international law, should be read disjunctively in accordance with the English version of
the Statute, rather than cumulatively in accordance with the French version.41 The
inclusion of the widespread and systematic prong is another way of excluding isolated
and random acts from the scope of crimes against humanity.42 However, it is only the
attack, and not the underlying act, that must be either widespread or systematic.43 Once it
is found that either requirement is met, the Court is not obliged to consider whether the
alternative qualifier is also satisfied.44

36

Id. at n60.

37

Tadic, Trial Judgment ¶649, 14 July 1997.

38

Id.

39

The Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, ¶550, 2000.

40

Akayesu, supra note 3, at ¶584.

41

Semanza, supra note 1, at ¶328.

42

Mettraux, supra note 21, at 259.

43

Kunurac, supra note 2, at ¶96.

44

Id. at ¶93.

11

“Widespread” refers to the large-scale nature of the attack and the number of
victims.45 The attack may be widespread as a result of a series of acts, or as a result of a
single act of extraordinary magnitude.46 “Systematic” refers to the organized nature of
the acts of violence and the improbability of their random occurrence. Patterns of crimes
are a common expression of systematicity.47 While the existence of a policy or plan may
be evidentially relevant to proving that an attack was widespread or systematic, it is not a
legal element of a crime against humanity.48
Assessing whether an attack was widespread or systematic depends upon how
the targeted population is defined. Therefore, the Court must first identify the attacked
population and, considering the means, methods, resources and result of the attack upon
the population, decide whether the attack was widespread or systematic. The
consequences of the attack, the number of victims, the nature of the acts, the participation
of authorities or any clear patterns of crimes can be taken into account in the Court’s
determination.49

(3) Directed Against Any Civilian Population
The phrase “directed against” implies that in the context of a crime against
humanity, the civilian population is the primary object of the attack rather than an

45

Id. at ¶94. See also The Prosecutor v. Musema, which held that “widespread”…is a massive, frequent,
large scale action, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against multiple
victims, while “systematic” constitutes organized action, following a regular pattern, on the basis of a
common policy and involves substantial public or private resources, at ¶203.

46

Mettraux, supra note 21, at 260.

47

Kunurac, supra note 29, at ¶94.

48

Semanza, supra note 1, at ¶329.

49

Kunurac, supra note 2, at ¶95.
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incidental target.50 In determining whether an attack was directed against a civilian
population, the Court considers the means and methods used in the attack, the victims’
status and number, the discriminatory nature of the attack, the type of crimes committed
in the course of the attack, the resistance to the assailants at the time of the attack and the
extent to which the attacking force complied with the precautionary mandates of the laws
of war.51
The overall attack, not the individual acts of the accused, must be directed
against a civilian population.52 The Court must be satisfied that the attack is directed
against an identifiable population rather than a loosely connected group of individuals.
However, the use of the word “population” does not mean that the entire population of
the geographical area being attacked must have been subjected to the attack. It is
sufficient to show that the number or the manner in which individuals were targeted
creates an identifiable population.53

(4) Committed on Discriminatory Grounds
Article 3 of the Statute requires that the attack directed against the civilian
population be committed “on national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds.”54
This discriminatory requirement applies to the attack, not to each underlying offense.
Therefore, the actual victim of the underlying offense need not be a part of the targeted
national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as long as the act against the outsider

50

Id.at ¶91. See also Semanza, supra note 1, at ¶330.

51

Id.

52

Mettraux, supra note 21, at 253.

53

Kunurac, supra note 2, at ¶90.

54

ICTR Statute, supra note 22.
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supports or furthers (or is intended to support or further) the overall discriminatory
attack.55 Such a definition of crimes against humanity circumscribes the Court’s
jurisdiction more narrowly than customary international law, as discriminatory intent has
historically been associated only with the underlying offense of persecution.56

(5) Mens Rea
To meet the mens rea requirement for crimes against humanity, the accused
must have intended to commit the underlying offense and must have known that there
was an attack on the civilian population and that the underlying offense comprised part of
the attack, or at least must have risked committing an act that was part of the attack. This
requirement does not entail knowledge of the details of the attack.57
Knowledge of the attack may be actual or constructive.58 Circumstantial
evidence may lead to an inference of knowledge, examples of which include the
accused’s position in the military or civilian hierarchy, participation in the takeover of
villages, claims of superiority over an enemy group, etc.59 Knowledge may also be

55

Semanza, supra note 1, at ¶331

56

Mettraux, supra note 21, at 269. Neither the IMT, CCL10, Tokyo, ICTY, nor the ICC list discriminatory
intent in their chapeau elements of crimes against humanity. However, this does not pose a problem for the
ICTR, as the Court has taken judicial notice of the fact that Tutsi is an ethnic group. See Akayesu, supra
note 3, at ¶130.

57

Kunurac, supra note 2, at ¶102. See also Semanza, supra note 1, at ¶332.

58

Tadic, supra note 30, at ¶657. The essential characteristic of a crime against humanity is not the intent to
commit the underlying act of murder, etc., that is in effect an ordinary crime under virtually all municipal
legal systems. Rather, it is the knowledge of the broader context in which that offense occurs which
transforms an ordinary crime into the elevated status of a crime against humanity, not only as a matter of
jurisdiction, but as a matter of the culpability that attaches to such acts. See Payam Akhavan, Contributions
of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to Development of
Definitions of Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 279, 281 (2000).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15.]
59

Mettraux, supra note 21, at 262.
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inferred from public knowledge, relying on the extent of media coverage, the scale of the
attack, or the general historical or political environment in which the attack occurred.60
To impose criminal liability, the motivations of the accused are irrelevant. A
crime against humanity can be committed for purely personal reasons, as it is not
necessary that the accused share the purpose or goal behind the attack. Whether the
accused intended to harm the targeted population or just the victim is also irrelevant. The
attack, and not the act of the accused, must be directed against the civilian population; the
accused need only actually or constructively know that the act is part thereof.61

(B) The Underlying Offense of Rape
The above chapeau elements represent the general requirements that a criminal
act must meet before it may qualify as a crime against humanity. In addition, the act at
the crime’s foundation must be listed in Article 3 of the ICTR.62 The underlying acts
themselves need not contain the chapeau elements of the attack (widespread and
systematic, directed against any civilian population, on discriminatory grounds), but must
form part of the attack.63 The individual crimes have their own specific elements.64 The
following is a discussion of the specific elements of rape.

60

Id.

61

Kunurac, supra note 2, at ¶103 (At most, evidence that the accused had purely personal motives could
indicate a rebuttable assumption that the accused was not aware that the act was part of an attack).

62

Mettraux, supra note 21, at 282-283 (murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment,
torture, rape, persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds, or other inhumane acts). It is unsettled
whether the ICTR’s list is exhaustive, or if offenses like disappearance or enforced prostitution recognized
under customary international law could be sanctioned by the Court. Id.

63

The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment ¶135, 21 May 1999. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 26.]
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The prosecution of gender related crimes in the ICTR and ICTY has given birth
to several definitions of rape and other forms of sexual violence which vary in language
and in scope.65 The Akayesu judgment in September, 1998, was the first conviction of
either genocide or crimes against humanity for sexual violence.66 Jean-Paul Akayesu was
the bourgmaster (mayor) of Taba Commune in Rwanda. Originally, Akayesu was not
charged with gender-related crimes. However, during the trial, a witness spontaneously
testified about the gang rape of her six-year-old daughter by Interahamwe soldiers.67
Another witness then said she was a victim of and witness to rape committed by Hutu
militia-men. The trial was convened so that the Office of the Prosecutor could
investigate and amend the indictment.68 As a result, the Trial Chamber was able to
recognize (1) sexual violence as an integral part of the genocide in Rwanda, (2) rape and
other forms of sexual violence as crimes against humanity, and (3) broad, progressive
definitions of rape and sexual violence.69 The Court held:
While rape has been defined in certain national jurisdictions as non-consensual
intercourse, variations on the act of rape may include acts which involve the

64

Id. For the accused to be found guilty of a crime against humanity, the Prosecution must prove that the
accused is responsible for one of the crimes charged pursuant to Article 6(1) and/or Article 6(3) of the
ICTR Statute.

65

Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International Law:
Extraodinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles (hereinafter Prosecuting Wartime Rape), 21 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 288, 317 (2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]
66

Id. at 318.

67

Interahamwe is Kinyarwanda for “those who work together.” They were groups of civilian militias who
worked under the direction of Rwandan authorities. The term Interahamwe originally referred to the youth
wing of the MRND, but evolved into meaning all militia participating in the genocide. See Human Rights
Watch, supra note 4.

68

Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 65, at 318.

69

Kelly D. Askin, Developments in International Criminal Law: Sexual Violence in Decisions and
Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status (hereinafter Developments), 93
A.J.I.L. 97, 107 (1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12.]
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insertion of objects and/or the use of bodily orifices not considered to be
intrinsically sexual.70
The Chamber considers that rape is a form of aggression and that the central
elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of
objects and body parts. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or Punishment does not catalogue specific
acts in its definition of torture, focusing rather on the conceptual framework of
state sanctioned violence. Like torture, rape is used for such purposes as
intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or
destruction of a person. Like torture, rape is a violation of personal dignity, and
rape in fact constitutes torture when inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity.71
The Chamber defines rape as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed
on a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence, which
includes rape, is considered to be any act of a sexual nature which is committed
on a person under circumstances which are coercive.72
The Court explained that coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a
show of physical force.73 Threats, intimidation, extortion, and other forms of duress
which feed on fear may constitute coercion, and coercion is inherent in circumstances
such as armed conflict or military presence among refugees.74 Applying these
definitions, the Court found that the testimony by Witness KK, regarding the thrusting of
a piece of wood into the “sexual organs” of a woman, constituted rape.75

70

Akayesu, supra note 3, at ¶596.

71

Id. at ¶597.

72

Id. at ¶598.

73

Id. at ¶688.

74

Id.

75

Id. at ¶686. There were no allegations that Akayesu himself actually committed rape, though he could be
held accountable because he ordered, instigated, or aided and abetted them through his presence, omissions
or encouragement. See Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 65, at 320.
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The Akayesu definition of rape was considered quite broad as compared to the
definition enunciated by the Kunurac judgment from the ICTY which was later adopted
by the ICTR in Semanza.76 The Kunurac judgment in February, 2001, rendered the first
conviction of rape as a crime against humanity in the ICTY.77 The trial was actually
against Dragoljub Kunurac, Radomir Kovac, and Zoran Vukovic. During the time
covered by the Amended Indictment, Kunurac was the leader of a reconnaissance unit of
the Bosnian Serb Army and Kovac and Vukovic were members of a Bosnian Serb
military unit in Foca.78 In the Spring of 1992, Serb military forces took over the
municipality of Foca, separated the Muslim and Croation men from women and children,
and held them in detention facilities where women and girls were systematically raped.79
In Kunurac, the Court built upon the elements of rape articulated in Furundzija,
a case involving multiple rapes committed against one woman during an interrogation.
Furundzija was charged with violations of the laws and customs of war for torture and
outrages upon personal dignity.80 The Furundzija Trial Chamber examined trends in
international jurisprudence and domestic laws from multiple jurisdictions and held that
the objective elements of rape are:
(i) the sexual penetration, however slight:
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any
other object used by the perpetrator; or

76

Semanza, supra note 1, at ¶344.

77

It was also the first ever conviction for enslavement in conjunction with rape. Askin, Prosecuting
Wartime Rape, supra note 65, at 333.

78

Id.

79

Id., citing Kunurac, Amended Indictment, IT-96-23-T, 1 Dec. 1999 & IT-96-23/1-T, 3 Mar. 2000.

80

Id. at 327, citing The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-PT, Indictment, Amended-Redacted, 2
June 1998.
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(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator;
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.81
The Trial Chamber then found the elements of rape were met “when Accused B
penetrated Witness A’s mouth, vagina and anus with his penis.”82
The elements of rape provided by the Kunurac Trial Chamber and affirmed by
the Kunurac Appeals Chamber modified the Furundzija elements. The Kunurac Court
concluded that:
the actus reus of the crime of rape in international law is constituted by:
the sexual penetration, however slight:
(a) of the vagina or the anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or
any other object used by the perpetrator; or
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator;
where such sexual penetration occurs without consent of the victim. Consent
for this purpose must be given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free will,
assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances.
The mens rea is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the
knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.83
After establishing the above elements, the Appeals Chamber elaborated on the Trial
Chamber’s discussion of the role of consent, or lack thereof, in rape cases:
…with regard to the role of force in the definition of rape, the Appeals Chamber
notes that the Trial Chamber appeared to depart from the Tribunal’s prior
definition of rape. However, in explaining its focus on the absence of consent
as the condition sine qua non of rape, the Trial Chamber did not disavow the
Tribunal’s earlier jurisprudence, but instead sought to explain the relationship
between force and consent. Force or threat of force provides clear evidence of
non-consent, but force is not an element per se of rape. In particular, the Trial
Chamber wished to explain that there are “factors [other than force] which
would render an act of sexual penetration non-consensual or non-voluntary on
the part of the victim.” A narrow focus on force or threat of force could permit
perpetrators to evade liability for sexual activity to which the other party had
81

The Prosecutor v. Furundzija (hereinafter Furundzija), IT-95-17/1, Trial Judgment ¶124-130, 10 Dec.
1998. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 28.]

82

Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 65, at 328, citing id. at ¶185.

83

Kunurac, supra note 2, at ¶127.
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not consented by taking advantage of coercive circumstances without relying on
physical force.84
The Kunurac Trial Chamber had emphasized the importance of recognizing factors
which would make a victim particularly vulnerable to an inability to refuse sex. Such
circumstances would be incapacity of an enduring or qualitative nature such as mental or
physical illness or young age, or of a temporary or circumstantial nature such as
psychological pressure.85 The basic principle behind the crime of rape is that violations
of sexual autonomy, which occur whenever the person subjected to the act has not freely
agreed or is otherwise not a voluntary participant, should be penalized.86
Though the ICTR Appeals Chamber affirmed the Akayesu Trial Chamber
Judgment in June, 2001 (after Kunurac had been decided by the ICTY), in May, 2003,
the ICTR decided to align itself with the Kunurac definition of rape in The Prosecutor v.
Semanza.87 Laurent Semanza served as bourgmestre of Bicumbi commune prior to
becoming President of the greater Kigali branch of the MRND political party in 1993.88
Semanza was found guilty of torture and murder as crimes against humanity for inciting a

84

Id. at ¶129-132. The Court went on to consider various approaches in domestic courts to rape that occurs
in such coercive circumstances that evidence of apparent consent is irrelevant. “For the most part, the
Appellants in this case were convicted of raping women held in de facto military headquarters, detention
centres and apartments maintained as soldiers’ residences. As the most egregious aspect of the conditions,
the victims were considered the legitimate sexual prey of their captors…Such detentions amount to
circumstances that were so coercive as to negate any possibility of consent.”

85

The Prosecutor v. Kunurac (hereinafter Kunurac Trial), IT-96-23, Trial Judgment ¶452, 22 Feb. 2001.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]

86

Id. at ¶457.

87

Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 65, at 321.

88

Press Release, Rwanda Tribunal Delivers Two Judgments Today, Arusha 15 May 2003, at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2003/344.htm. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 39.]
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Hutu crowd in Gikoro commune to rape Tutsi women before killing them.89 In deciding
upon the definition of rape to be applied, the Trial Chamber held:
The Akayesu Judgment enunciated a broad definition of rape which included
any physical invasion of a sexual nature in coercive circumstances and which
was not limited to forcible sexual intercourse. The Appeals Chamber of the
ICTY, in contrast, affirmed a narrower interpretation, defining the material
element of rape as a crime against humanity as the non-consensual penetration,
however slight, of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the
perpetrator or by any other object used by the perpetrator, or of the mouth of the
victim by the penis of the perpetrator. Consent for this purpose must be given
voluntarily and freely and is assessed within the context of the surrounding
circumstances.90
While this mechanical style of defining rape was originally rejected by this
Tribunal, the Chamber finds the comparative analysis in Kunurac to be
persuasive and thus will adopt the definition of rape approved by the ICTY
Appeals Chamber. In doing so, the Chamber recognizes that other acts of
sexual violence that do not satisfy this narrow definition may be prosecuted as
other crimes against humanity within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal such as
torture, persecution, enslavement, or other inhumane acts.91
The Court then held that the mens rea for rape as a crime against humanity is the
intention to effect the prohibited sexual penetration with the knowledge that the victim
has not given consent.92
Of the various definitions of rape enunciated by the ICTR and the ICTY,
Akayesu is the broadest, Furundzija is the strictest, and Kunurac is somewhere in
between. In Akayesu, the Court made a conscious decision not to focus on “mechanical

89

Id. Though other charges of rape and sexual violence were included in the indictment in relation to the
Musha Church and Mwulire Hill massacres, the Chamber ruled that the Prosecutor failed to present
sufficient evidence. Immediately following Semanza’s instructions, “Victim A” was raped, and “Victim B”
was killed. Though Victim A claims that Victim B was also raped, the Court held that there was
insufficient evidence to draw any conclusions. Semanza’s intentional encouragement and instigation of the
rapes/murders enabled him to be held accountable. See Semanza, supra note 1, at ¶476-478.

90

Semanza, supra note 1, at ¶344.

91

Id. at ¶345.

92

Id. at ¶346.
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descriptions” of objects and body parts.93 Looking to the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Court recognized
that its focus was on the conceptual framework of state sanctioned violence rather than on
the cataloging of specific acts.94 The Court found this approach “more useful in
international law,”95 and thus defined rape in a similarly broad spirit. In Furundzija and
Kunurac, the Court looked to domestic rape laws from multiple jurisdictions, as opposed
to the structure of definitions in conventions and treaties.96 Thus, they established
objective elements of rape which include the mechanical descriptions that Akayesu had
admittedly avoided. However, the Kunurac Court was concerned that by not addressing
consent in its definition, Furundzija had construed rape more narrowly than international
law requires.97 Thus, Kunurac explained the relationship between force and consent and
incorporated into its rape definition factors other than force which could render an act of
sexual penetration non-consensual.98
Semanza acknowledged the relative broadness of Akayesu and narrowness of
Kunurac, but found Kunurac persuasive. Thus, the material elements of rape, according
to the most recent decisions of both the ICTR and the ICTY are:
(1) the non-consensual penetration, however slight
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or by
any other object used by the perpetrator; or

93

Akayesu, supra note 3, at ¶597.

94

Id.

95

Id.

96

Furundzija, supra note 81, at ¶185. See also Kunurac Trial, supra note 85, at ¶127.

97

Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 65, at 334.

98

Kunurac Trial, supra note 85, at ¶129.
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(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator.
(2) Consent for this purpose must be given voluntarily and freely and is
assessed within the context of the surrounding circumstances.99

IV.

Words/Phrases Witnesses Are Required to Say
Considering the above elements of rape adopted by the ICTR in Semanza, it

would seem that during trial, a witness would be required to describe the act of
penetration in detail, naming the body part penetrated and what it was penetrated by.
However, in practice, this has not been the case.100 When asked about what exactly
witnesses are required to say in order to satisfy the legal elements of rape, Peggy Kuo, a
former Prosecutor for the ICTY who helped prosecute Kunurac, said:
…we began the [Kunurac] trial with an American-style approach to rape
testimony, that is, we asked witnesses about specific body parts. This, as you
can imagine, was very difficult, and sometimes we had to “lead” the witness by
asking, “Did he put his penis into your vagina,” etc., which was very ackward,
but then all they had to do was say, “yes.” In a US trial, you wouldn’t even be
able to ask that because it’s really “leading” the witness. As the trial
progressed, we realized that the defense was not challenging the specific acts, so
we just asked things like, “What did he do then?” and had already prepped the
witnesseses that they could just say, “He raped me.” This seemed sufficient
until April 19, when Judge Hunt prompted the prosecution to ask whether the
acts were done without the victim’s consent…Thereafter, we included the
question, “Did he do that against your will?” which was strange because the
word “rape” especially in Bosnian/Croation/Serbian already implies lack of
consent. But that seemed to be sufficient. So, because the law does not
specifically require the description of specific body parts, and the defense did
not challenge the nature of the acts (e.g., did penetration occur?) we were able
just to elicit, “I was raped,” plus “it was against my will.”101
Ms. Kuo went on to acknowledge that there may be circumstances in which one would
need to be more explicit, for example, if the defense raises a challenge, or if there was an
99

Semanza, supra note 1, at ¶344.

100

Email written by Peggy Kuo to Nicole Dorsky on 24 Oct. 2003 in response to an email asking what
exactly witnesses are required to say during rape trials in the ICTY (hereinafter Peggy Kuo email).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 40.]
101

Id.
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important detail such as the description of an instance of oral rape, or if the medical
evidence were contested in some way.102 However, she added that defense lawyers were
often just as uncomfortable being explicit as the witnesses were.103
Ms. Kuo’s statements are supported by the Kunurac transcript, as well as the
transcript of Furundzija, the two cases upon which the Semanza definition of rape is
based.104 In Furundzija, the rape testimony was given in closed session and is therefore
unavailable; however the Prosecution’s opening statement helps illustrate how rape was
most likely discussed. The Prosecution began by describing the unlawful interrogation
for which Furundzija was indicted. The description referred to the “prolonged series of
physical, mental, and serious sexual abuses, including repeated rapes” that Witness A
endured.105 At this point, the rape allegation did not contain any further details.
However, later on the Prosecution elaborated upon the alleged rape by calling it “vaginal
and oral penetration.”106 Throughout the opening statement, rapes were alternately
referred to as either “rape” in general or “vaginal, anal, and oral penetration”
specifically.107 In response, the Defense’s opening statement did not deny that sexual
assault had occurred or contest any specific allegations of vaginal, anal, or oral
penetration.108 Rather, the Defense focused on proving that Furundzija was not present

102

Id.

103

Id..

104

Transcripts of witness rape testimony has been difficult to find because it often takes place in closed
session, which is not available to the general public.
105

Furundzija transcript at 61. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 30.]

106

Id. at 64.

107

Id. at 65, 71, 147 (general description), at 66, 77 (specific body parts).
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for any sexual assault upon Witness A.109 The Defense referred to the alleged rape as
“sexual assault” consistently throughout its opening statement.110 The Prosecution’s first
witness, who did not testify in a closed session, was not a victim, but a local doctor that
saw rape victims enter the hospital where he worked. Though he did not personally
examine rape victims (as that was a task reserved for female physicians), he recalled a
woman coming in to the hospital who had been “raped” and who “was bleeding from the
vagina and anus.”111 The Defense did not object to the Doctor’s description.112
The Kunurac transcript provides even more information about what exactly
witnesses are required to say. As Ms. Kuo mentioned, on April 19, 2000, Judge Hunt
made a statement regarding how an act of rape should be described by a witness:
I’ve always understood rape to be the intercourse without consent and that if
acquiescence is obtained by force, then there is no consent…You [Mr.
Ryneveld, Prosecutor] or each of the prosecutors has usually allowed the
witness to say she was raped…Now, if it be the fact, may I suggest that you
obtain from the witnesses that they did not consent.113
After Judge Hunt’s intervention, Ms. Kuo proceeded to examine Witness AS, a rape
victim, accordingly.
Initially, Witness AS referred to what happened to her as “rape” in general.114
She then described the number of soldiers involved, the room in which she was raped,
what she was required to do afterwards, and the names of the perpetrators that she could
108

Id. at 79-87.

109

Id. at 79

110

Id. at 79-87
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Id. at 148.
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Id.
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Kunurac transcript at 1980. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 33.]

114

Id. at 1999.
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recall.115 This description was followed by Ms. Kuo asking “And when you use the word
‘rape’, and I’m sorry to have to ask you this, what specifically do you mean they did?”
Witness AS replied “They destroyed everything in me.” Ms. Kuo then asked, “Just so the
Court knows, since the Court needs to know specifically for the record, did they put their
penises into your vagina?” Witness AS replied “Yes.”116 The Defense did not object.117
This method of questioning was repeated throughout the examination of
Witness AS.118 She would say she was “raped”119 and Ms. Kuo would ask her to
elaborate on the surrounding circumstances, such as who the perpetrators were and what
they were wearing (civilian or uniform clothing) and where she was.120 After Witness
AS’s description, Ms. Kuo would then ask her what she meant by the word rape.
Sometimes Ms. Kuo would say something like “When you use the word ‘rape’, do you
mean what you described before, what happened to you at Karaman’s house?”121 Other
times, Ms. Kuo would say “And I’m sorry again, but the Court needs to know very
specifically, when you used the word ‘rape’, do you mean that he put his penis into your

115

Id.

116

Id. at 2000.

117

Id.

118

Id.
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Witness AS was raped on multiple occasions because she was a sex slave to the accused.
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Kunurac transcript at 2010, 2011, 2017, 2027.
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Id. at 2011.
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vagina against your will?”122 Witness AS would simply reply “Yes” to Ms. Kuo’s
questions without any objection from the Defense or the Judges.123
When the Defense cross-examined Witness AS, it did not attempt to disprove
the specific acts of penetration relayed through the careful questioning by Ms. Kuo.
Instead, the Defense concentrated on trying to discredit Witness AS’s recollection of the
surrounding circumstances by asking her details about the buildings and rooms in which
the rapes took place.124 Witness AS, growing frustrated with the Defense’s relentless
questioning about geographic details would say things like “Listen, I can’t remember all
the details, because I wasn’t raped by the buildings. Do you understand that? I did not
live in Foca.”125 The Defense never asked Witness AS to provide details of the rape itself
or name the body parts penetrated or what they were penetrated by.126
Based on witness testimony given in open session in Furundzija and Kunurac, it
appears that a rape victim must say he/she was raped, but that the naming of body parts
can be left to careful yes or no questioning by the Prosecution. Since the Semanza
definition of rape is based on Kunurac which is based on Furundzija, the same rules
should apply in the ICTR. However, the fact that witnesses may not always have to go
into explicit detail on the witness stand does not mean they never have to go into explicit
detail at all. Ms. Kuo has said that:

122

Id. at 2017.

123

Id. at 2011, 2017.
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Id. at 2042, 2043.
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Id. at 2043. Foca is the town in which Witness AS was held captive as a sex slave.
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Id.
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…we as prosecutors and investigators (almost always women) did ask the
witnesses during our interviews to describe the incident in greater detail, so we
would not encounter any surprises in the courtroom. For the most part, the
witnesses were able to speak in “private” about these matters. A lot depended
on how comfortable we were able to make them (I always tried to set up my
office in a non-intimidating way: fresh flowers, cookies and coffee, at a table
away from my desk). It was painful and difficult for the women, but when we
got the message across that we were not judging them, they were quite open.127

V.

Comparison to Rape Trials in U.S. Courts
Though it seems likely that ICTR defense attorneys will follow the example set

by their ICTY counterparts in cases like Kunurac and Furundzija, there remains the
possibility that they will urge the Court to adopt the more accused-friendly rules of
procedure and evidence for rape trials required in nations such as the United States.

A.

Rape as Defined by the Model Penal Code
In 1962, the American Law Institute published the Model Penal Code (MPC),

“a massive effort to codify the entire criminal law,” which has influenced the law of
many, but not all, states.128 Section 213.1 of the MPC reads:
(1) Rape. A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife is guilty
of rape if:
(a) he compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious
bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone; or
(b) he has substantially impaired her power to appraise or control her
conduct by administering or employing without her knowledge drugs,
intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resistance; or
(c) the female is unconscious; or
(d) the female is less than 10 years old.
Rape is a felony of the second degree unless (i) in the course thereof the actor
inflicts serious injury upon anyone, or (ii) the victim was not a voluntary social
companion of the actor upon the occasion of the crime and had not previously

127

Peggy Kuo email, supra note 100.

128

KEITH BURGESS-JACKSON, RAPE: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION 72 (1996). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 5.]

28

permitted him sexual liberties, in which cases the offense is a felony of the first
degree.
(2) Gross Sexual Imposition. A male who has sexual intercourse with a female
not his wife commits a felony of the third degree if:
(a) he compels her to submit by any threat that would prevent resistance by
a woman or ordinary resolution; or
(b) he knows that she suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders
her incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct; or
(c) he knows that she is unaware that a sexual act is being committed upon
her or that she submits because she mistakenly supposes that he is her
husband.129
The MPC says the phrase “sexual intercourse” includes oral and anal intercourse, with
some penetration, however slight. Emission is not required.130 There is no mention of
consent in the MPC sections on rape or gross sexual imposition. However, Section 2.11
of the MPC provides that “The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an
offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent negatives an element of the
offense.”131 Since consent presumably negates the element of force or threat contained in
the definition of rape, it may serve as a defense to that charge.132
Many individual states have departed from the exact wording of the definition
of rape in the MPC. Some have made the crime sex-neutral rather than sex-specific, so
that men and women can be both victims and perpetrators.133 Most have abolished the
marital rape exemption.134 States have substituted “against her will” or “without her
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consent” for the “by force” language of the MPC.135 Yet whether the language in
question is “by force,” “against her will,” or “without her consent,” or a combination of
the three, U.S. rape cases have often focused on the victim’s mental state and behavior.136
Concern about the potential fault of the victim led to procedural and evidentiary
rules such as (1) the corroboration requirement, which in practice prevents a defendant
from being convicted solely on the basis of the victim’s testimony; (2) the utmostresistance requirement, which precluded a conviction of rape if the victim submitted,
even if she were paralyzed with fear and did not consent; (3) prompt-notice or promptreporting requirements; and (4) cautionary instructions from the judge to the jury about
rape being an easy charge to make but a difficult one to defend.137

B.

The Trial Experience of Rape Victims in the U.S.
Before the advent of rape-shield laws, which make it more difficult (but by no

means impossible) for the defense to expose the victim’s sexual history, defense
attorneys almost always tried to destroy the victim’s character or reputation by
connecting her to alcohol and drugs, “fast living,” unfit motherhood, poor employment
records, and other immoral conduct.138 Existing rape-shield laws vary widely in scope
and procedural detail. The statutes of Texas and eleven other states allow sexual conduct
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evidence subject to the discretion of the trial court judge under traditional relevancy
standards (the probative value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effects).139
Despite certain protections offered by rape-shield laws, there is an abundance of
anecdotal evidence from trial records, press accounts, and personal accounts that rape
victims are subject to more abusive questioning than are victims of other crimes.140 The
structure of cross-examination allows the defense to reconstruct the victim’s testimony;
to disconnect, overemphasize, or underemphasize certain points to confuse and discredit
her presentation. Often, the goal is to cast the victim as a liar by making her account
sound more like the defendant’s version of consensual intercourse.141
A defense attorney’s goal of discrediting the rape victim is aided by the cultural
myths and stereotypes about men’s and women’s sexuality that can, and do, influence
jurors.142 Rape trials often depend on and perpetuate a paradigmatic tale of rape in which
an attractive, modestly dressed victim is brutally beaten and sexually assaulted by a
deviant sociopath with whom she has no prior relationship. Deviation from this
paradigm, such as when the woman is dressed provocatively or is on a date with the
perpetrator, frequently leads to disbelief of the woman.143 American society has an
inclination to punish those who inflict “real,” or paradigmatic, rape, and an inclination to
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dismiss or disbelieve other rape accounts perceived as inconsistent with the real rape
standard.144
In an effort to distinguish a particular case from the real rape standard, defense
attorneys may focus on the sexuality, or unchastity, of the victim. Feminist legal scholar
Catherine MacKinnon has remarked about the pornographic nature of rape trials as the
intimate details of a deviant sexual encounter are relayed to an audience.145 The public
spectacle of sexualizing the victim’s body serves to question her reason and her
respectability.146 Some commentators refer to the victim’s trial experience as a “second
victimization.”147 Both rape and cross-examination involve unwanted invasions of the
victim’s autonomy and privacy.148 A defense attorney may use cross-examination to
demean or demoralize the victim by eroticizing and objectifying her traumatic
experience.149

C.

Justifications for Different Rules for Rwandan Rape Victims
The vigorous cross-examinations that characterize U.S. rape trials would be

inappropriate in the ICTR. The American approach to rape trials is tailored to a single
victim, single rapist (or in the case of gang rapes, multiple rapists) scenario. It would not
work if applied to prosecutions of the mass rape that took place in Rwanda. The ICTR
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rules of procedure and evidence pertaining to rape are not rooted in a general distrust of
complainant reliability. In fact, Rule 96 states that no corroborative testimony is
required, that consent is allowed as a defense only in limited circumstances, and that prior
sexual conduct is inadmissible as evidence.150 The protections accorded to sexual assault
victims by Rule 96 are more explicit and rigid than the variety of rape shield laws
available, but often circumvented, in the U.S.
The ICTR’s accommodation of rape victims can be explained in several ways.
First, the ICTR does not have great reason to fear the vengeful, lying complainant that
U.S. Courts seem to fear. It is an established fact that Rwandan women were subject to
mass rape. Also, by publicizing their rape experiences, Rwandan women risk rejection
by their families and communities and inability to remarry. The costs to Rwandan
women for testifying in rape trials may have eased the ICTR’s concerns about false
accusations. Second, the ICTR cannot require corroboration for rape that occurred during
a genocide campaign that imposed a sense of helplessness on its victims. It would be
unfair to expect Rwandan women to have immediately reported their rape or sought
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medical attention at a time when they must have felt the world was against them. Third,
considering the genocidal atmosphere in which the mass rape of Rwandan women
occurred, the likelihood of the presence of the victim’s consent in the cases being
prosecuted by the ICTR is slim.
American style cross-examination by defense attorneys may also be out of place
in the ICTR because there is no jury. As previously discussed, cross-examinations of
rape victims in the U.S. have been described as “pornographic vignettes” in which the
defense attorney sexualizes the scene of the crime by repeatedly referring to the victim’s
body parts and provocative clothing and behavior.151 This is done in an effort to
distinguish the case at hand from the paradigmatic rape scenario ingrained in the minds of
jurors, thereby raising doubt as to the victim’s chastity and the accused’s guilt. Such a
method of cross-examination would be useless in the cases before the ICTR because rape
in a genocidal context fits squarely within the confines of the rape paradigm (violence or
threat of violence, strangers, helpless women, etc.).
To apply U.S. practice to rape cases before the ICTR would create an
environment similar to that faced by Aboriginal rape victims in Australia. It has been
said that the treatment of Aboriginal witnesses, especially women speaking of sexual
assault, shows the capacity of evidence law to allow the most appalling racist and sexist
stereotypes to operate unchecked in the adversarial trial.152 Statistics suggest that
Aboriginal women are more likely to be victims of sexual assault than non-Aboriginal
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women.153 In almost every rape trial studied in New South Wales, the complainant was
asked questions about sexual organs.154 This is particularly difficult for Aboriginal
women, who are generally ashamed to discuss body parts or sexual activity in the
presence of men.155 One commentator pointed out that greater distress on the part of
Aboriginal complainants is not surprising because of the qualitatively more offensive
defense tactics used to discredit Aboriginal women, who are generally asked more
questions about drinking, drug use, and lying than other complainants.156 Crossexamination that asks about information previously given is perceived as confusing, rude,
or pointless, so that an Aboriginal person may respond with silence, “I don’t know,” or
agreement to be polite. This can be wrongly interpreted by juries as evidence of
unreliability.157
The trial experience of Aboriginal rape victims led the Queensland Criminal
Justice Commission to propose a detailed jury instruction to assist predominantly nonAboriginal judges and juries in fairly assessing Aboriginal witnesses whose manner of
testifying does not conform to the standard constructed by the dominant legal culture.158
The difficulties faced by Aboriginal rape victims in Australia help illustrate the need for a
culturally relative approach to rules of procedure and evidence. The aggressive
questioning about sexual organs and behavior often employed by defense attorneys is
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usually stifling and disconcerting to the victim. Limited value should be placed on
responses to questions that are designed to cause discomfort, and not to elicit truth.
The sexually intrusive cross-examinations widely used by defense attorneys in
the U.S. and Australia were designed to portray the complainant as an immoral seductress
who somehow shares a portion of the responsibility for the rape in question. Defense
attorneys in the ICTR will probably not share this goal. Because Rule 96 allows a
defense of consent only in very limited circumstances, it is not likely that consent will be
argued.159 Thus, the defense will claim either that the rape did not occur, or, assuming
the victim was raped, that the accused is not responsible. Such arguments do not
necessitate the pornographic vignette which, at least in the U.S. and Australia, seems to
have become part of proving consent.

VI.

The Cultural Implications of Rape Testimony
The Akayesu Court noted a couple of cultural issues arising out of witness

testimony—the impact of trauma, interpretation from Kinyarwanda into French and
English, and the cultural factors affecting the evidence provided by witnesses.160 The
Court considered the testimony of witnesses with an understanding that recounting
traumatic experiences is likely to evoke memories of fear and pain once inflicted upon
the witness and thereby affect his or her ability to recall the sequence of events in a
judicial context.161 Noting that the majority of the witnesses testified in Kinyarwanda,
the Court held that the terms “gusambanya,” “kurungora,” “kuryamana,” and “gufata ku
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ngufu” were used interchangeably by witnesses and correctly translated by the
interpreters as “rape.”162 The Court also acknowledged that according to Dr. Ruzindana,
an expert witness on linguistics for the ICTR, it is a particular feature of Rwandan culture
that people are not always direct in answering questions, especially if the question is
delicate.163 In such cases, the Court must rely on the context, the colloquialisms of the
community, the identity of and the relation between the orator and listener, and the
subject matter of the question.164
In Rwanda, as in many other nations, victims of rape, and not perpetrators, carry
the social stigma, and often end up feeling isolated and ostracized.165 Some Rwandan
women fear rejection and an inability to reintegrate or remarry.166 Others fear their
attacker or feel guilty for having survived the genocide.167 Their guilt is reinforced by
Tutsi returnees who suspect that they collaborated with Hutus to ensure their survival.168
Many rape victims contracted sexually transmitted diseases, had their genitals mutilated,
and/or were impregnated by their rapists. Since abortion is illegal in Rwanda, some
women suffer serious health consequences from self-induced or clandestine abortions;
others committed infanticide or have a child rejected by their family and community.169
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On top of dealing with the social and physical consequences of being a rape
victim, women in Rwanda must also operate under second class status. Thousands of
widows and daughters have no legal claim to their deceased husbands’ or fathers’
property because they are women.170 They also have difficulty obtaining their husbands’
pensions because of an arduous application process combined with the intimidation of
dealing authority figures.171
Because Tutsi women were the object of genocide propaganda spread by Hutu
extremists, they may see themselves as “enemies of the state.”172 Propogandists
portrayed Tutsi women as arrogant seductresses and spies who wanted to dominate and
undermine the Hutu.173 “Rape served to shatter these images by humiliating, degrading,
and ultimately destroying the Tutsi women.”174 The subordinate role that Rwandan
women occupy in society, combined with the shame of being the targets of hateful
propaganda and sexual violence, compounded by fear of reprisals and guilt for having
survived, resulted in reluctance to speak about their experience.175

A.

The Cultural Implications of Requiring Witnesses to Use Culturally
Offensive Words
As discussed above in Section IV, it is quite possible that witnesses will not be
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examination before the Judges; however, this does not mean that they will never have to
confront their cultural discomfort with saying them. At some point before they are
placed on the witness stand, rape victims have to describe in detail what happened to
them. An adequate description necessitates words like “penis” and “vagina.”
Just saying the word “rape” is difficult enough for these women, considering the
shame and fear that haunts them. If they are required to use words which make them
even more uncomfortable, reporting their experience could be overwhelming. Going into
detail about their vagina, anus, or mouth being penetrated may bring back memories they
are eager to lose. During the genocide, women were individually raped, gang-raped,
raped with objects such as knives, sticks, and gun barrels, held in sexual slavery, and/or
sexually mutilated.176 This sexual violence often took place after women were forced to
witness the torture and murder of their families and the destruction and looting of their
homes.177 Sometimes women were forced to kill their own children before or after being
raped in front of them.178 Many women neared death several times and in some cases
begged to be killed so their suffering would end. Instead, their lives would be spared so
they could be raped and humiliated.179
For Rwandan women, to say that someone raped them focuses on the act of the
perpetrator. It is a general allegation of wrongdoing committed by someone else.
However, to discuss what happened to their vagina, their anus, or their mouth focuses on
the specific effects the rape had upon them, many of which are permanent. Because of
176
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the amount of times they were raped or the objects inserted into their vagina or anus,
many women can no longer bear children. In a country where women exist mainly to
function as mother and wife, acknowledging an inability to give birth could devastate
their futures as infertility and loss of virginity may make them unmarriageable.180
Women may also fear that recounting the specific details of what was done to their
bodies will shame their families. Rape “has not throughout most of recorded history,
been a crime against women. It has significantly however been a heinous crime against
men: a humiliation inflicted upon a nation, an affront to a man’s pride as guardian of his
women.”181
Some rape victims experience a form of post-traumatic stress disorder called
rape trauma syndrome.182 Rape trauma syndrome causes nightmares, inability to stop
thinking about the rape, sudden panic that the rape is reoccurring, and panic associated
with reminders of the rape.183 Behavioral symptoms include difficulty sleeping and/or
concentrating, angry outbursts, fear, and anxiety.184 Discussing the details of what
happened to their bodies may trigger the effects of rape trauma syndrome and thereby
deter victims from testifying.

180

Christine Chinkin, Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International Law, 5 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 326,
330 (1994). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13.]

181

Id. at 338, citing Gibson, The Discourse of Sex/War: Thoughts on Catherine MacKinnon’s 1993 Oxford
Amnesty Lecture, 2 FEMINIST LEGAL STUDIES 179 (1993).

182

M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 353 (1999).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]
183

Id.

184

Id. at 354. Keep in mind that it is not only women who suffered from rape, but men too, who often face
even greater obstacles discussing their experiences. See also Stuart Turner, Surviving Sexual Assault and
Sexual Torture, in MALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 75, 81, 110 (Gillian C. Mezey & Michael B. King
eds., 1992).

40

VII.

Ways to Bridge the Cultural Gap
As Ms. Kuo remarked above, it is important to make rape victims feel safe and

comfortable. Prosecutors and investigators covering rape cases should be predominantly
female so as to minimize intimidation. Considering the sense of ostracism by family and
community that the victim is likely to feel, the rooms where interviews are being held
should not be arranged in a polarizing fashion. Perhaps there should be a couch where
the victim sits with a place beside her for a prosecutor or investigator to position herself.
Victims should be informed of the protections afforded to them by Rule 96 to decrease
their anxiety about potential retaliation by the accused.185 This could be accompanied by
a discussion of how their testimony could help bring justice and prevent impunity for
rapists.186
Before addressing the specifics of the actual rape, prosecutors and investigators
should get to know the victim by asking questions about her family, her community, her
feelings about what happened in Rwanda, her post-genocide experience, etc. After the
victim has shared some personal information, prosecutors and investigators should
acknowledge the difficulty of reporting a rape and commend the victim’s bravery. They
should assure the victim of their desire to be respectful and sensitive. Initially, general
questions should be asked—who, when, and where. After the perpetrators and
surrounding circumstances have been described, prosecutors and investigators should ask
for details about the specific act of rape. Like the Prosecutors in Kunurac, they could
begin by leading the victim with questions like “Did his penis enter your vagina?” The
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victim should have the opportunity to discuss the rape/s as she pleases. If her story is not
explicit enough, the prosecutors and investigators may press for more information, using
words like “penis” and “vagina”, but at the same time expressing an understanding of the
victim’s discomfort. The victim should be reminded that the fault rests on the rapist, and
that the lasting effects of the rape (i.e. mutilated genitals or infertility) are evidence of
triumph over adversity and a will to survive.
If the actual trial is conducted similarly to Kunurac, the witness will probably
not be required to use culturally offensive words during examination or crossexamination. Words like “penis” and “vagina” may be left to yes or no questions
formulated by the Prosecution. However, prosecutors and investigators should be sure to
warn witnesses that the Defense may contest certain allegations or medical evidence, in
which case witnesses would be asked to be more explicit. Prosecutors and investigators
should remind witnesses that providing more information in response to questions posed
by the Defense may be uncomfortable, but will ultimately help bring the perpetrators to
justice.

VIII.

Conclusion

In order to meet the legal elements of rape as a crime against humanity
according to Semanza, the Prosecutor must prove that the accused is accountable for
1) the non-consensual penetration, however slight (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim
by the penis of the perpetrator or by any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the
mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator, when 2)consent for this purpose has
not been given voluntarily and freely as assessed considering the surrounding
circumstances. The rape must take place in the context of a widespread or systematic
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attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnical, racial, or religious
grounds. The accused must be aware of the attack and know that the rape could form a
part of the attack. While witnesses may not be required to use culturally offensive words
such as “penis” or “vagina” during examination or cross-examination at trial due to
carefully crafted yes or no questions formulated by the Prosecutor, they will have to use
such words in describing the incident at some point.
Addressing the details of rape surfaces the shame and fear that victims probably
feel. In Rwanda, it is the living victims of rape that carry the social stigma of having
survived the genocide and suspicions of having corroborated with Hutu extremists.
Many rape victims now have sexually transmitted diseases, mutilated genitals, and
serious health consequences from self-induced or clandestine abortions which interfere
with their ability to marry or remarry. Prosecutors and investigators must create a
comfortable, accepting, and safe environment for these women to recount their painful
experiences. The victims should be constantly reminded that the fault rests on the rapist,
that the lasting effects of rape that weigh so heavily upon them are evidence of triumph
over adversity and a will to survive, and that the more information they reveal, the easier
it is to bring the perpetrator to justice.
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